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The United States Supreme Court declared in Sierra Club v.   or ton' 
that public interest environmental organizations could not rely on their own 
institutional interest in environmental resources and issues to establish 
standing to sue,2 but rather, must rely on the interests of identifiable 
- -- 
' 405 U.S. 727 (1972). 
See infra notes 1 1-18 and accompanying text for an explanation of the "standing to sue" 
concept. 
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members of the ~r~an iza t ion .~  Ever since, environmental organizations that 
litigate have been required to establish standing by identifying specific 
individual members whose environmental interests would be adversely 
affected by the action challenged. 
The Supreme Court also established, in Hunt v. Washington Apple 
Advertising ~ornrnission,4 that representational standing is not limited to 
traditional membership organizations.' The Court specifically recognized 
standing for a state commission that legally had no members, but was a 
membership organization "for all practical purposes."6 Hunt clearly 
stipulates that having a legally recognized class of members is not an 
absolute prerequisite for standing.' Hunt leaves less clear the question of 
what minimum factors are necessary to establish standing for an 
organization that is "for all practical purposes" a membership organization. 
Many public interest environmental organizations are organized as non- 
membership organizations, or other organizational forms in which the 
organization's constituency does not vote to select the board of directors or 
officers of the organization.* Typically, these organizations have a "self 
perpetuating" board of directors, in which the sitting board of directors 
elects both officers and new board members of the ~r~an iza t ion .~  For these 
organizations, the question of whether membership voting rights are an 
essential element of representational standing assumes great importance. A 
few decisions, with varying results and rationales, have addressed the 
question of whether voting rights are essential to organizational standing.'' 
This article will examine the law of standing, and specifically, the 
conflicting decisions concerning the importance of voting rights in order to 
establish organizational standing. The article concludes that voting rights 
should not be essential to the assertion of representational standing. 
Nevertheless, the article will also consider alternate forms of organization 
' Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 739-40. 
432 U.S. 333 (1977). 
Id. 
Id. at 344. 
' See generally Hunt, 432 U.S. 333. 
See Charles H. Steen & Michael B. Hopkins, Corporate Governance Meets the 
Constitution: A Case Study of Nonprofit Membership Corporations and Their Associational 
Standing Under Article 111. 17 REV. LlnG. 209,2 1 1 (1 998). 
See Robin Dimieri & Stephen Weiner, The Public Interest and Governing Boar& of 
Nonprofit Health Care Institutions, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1029, 1043 (1981) (discussing 
nonprofit corporation statutes). 
'O See Steen & Hopkins, supra note 8, at 22 1-5 1. 
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that will improve an organization's chances of establishing representational 
standing, while addressing the concerns that lead organizations to avoid a 
voting membership in the first place. 
A. Environmental Organizations Lack Standing to Represent Their Own 
Interest in Environmental Issues-Sierra Club v. Morton 
Sierra Club 11. Morton is often regarded as the seminal case concerning 
standing for environmental organizations. The standing doctrine involves 
the issue of who (if anyone) is entitled to bring a particular legal claim in 
court;" the question, "who has standing to sue?," is vitally important to the 
enforcement of the nation's major environmental laws. A number of federal 
environmental protection laws, including the Clean Air ~ c t ' ~  and the 
Endangered Species ~ c t , ' ~  contain "citizen suit provisions" that confer 
standing on citizens to sue violators of the law.I4 The U.S. Supreme Court 
has clearly established a standing requirement and has grounded this 
requirement in Article 111, section 2 of the Constitution, which grants the 
judiciary the power to hear "cases" and "controversies."'5 Under modem 
standing doctrine,I6 a plaintiff must meet three requirements to have Article 
I11 standing: first, the plaintiff must show that he or she has suffered an 
"injury in fact"; second, he or she must establish causation, showing that the 
alleged injury can be fairly traced to the challenged action; third, the 
plaintiff must show that the injury "is likely to be redressed by a favorable 
decision" of the court." However, before these criteria were formally 
defined, the 1972 Supreme Court held in Sierra Club v. Morton that 
"standing to sue" means that a party has a sufficient stake in an otherwise 
justiciable controversy to obtain judicial resolution of that c o n t r o ~ e r s ~ . ' ~  
In the Sierra Club case, the plaintiffs sought to prevent the lease of 
several thousand acres of national forest land near Mineral King Valley in 
" See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,498 (1975) ("In essence the question of standing 
is whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of 
articular issues."). 
Pub. L. No. 109-80,69 Stat. 322 (1955). 
l 3  16 U.S.C. $$ 1531-1544 (2000). 
l4 See 42 U.S.C. $ 7604 (2000); 16 U.S.C. $ 1540(g). 
IS U.S. CONST. art. 111, 5 2, cl. 1 ("The Judicial Power shall extend to all Cases . . . [and] to 
Controversies. . . ."). 
l6 These criteria were articulated in the 1992 Supreme Court's decision in Lujan v. Defenders 
of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992), in explaining 1970s era standing precedents. 
" See generally Lujan, 504 U.S. 555. 
Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 731-32. 
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the Sierra Nevada Mountains in California for a proposed ski resort 
d e v e l ~ ~ m e n t . ' ~  The Supreme Court advanced the law of environmental 
standing by clearly recognizing that the environmental plaintiffs could assert 
non-economic environmental interests, such as recreational interests and 
aesthetics, to establish standing.20 Nevertheless, the Court rejected the 
standing of the Sierra Club to sue in the case, holding that an environmental 
organization lacks any direct cognizable injury based solely on its own 
longstanding interest in environmental i s s~es .~ '  The Court held that an 
interest in the issue being litigated was not, by itself, sufficient to establish 
standing.22 Rather, the organization would have to establish a concrete 
injury to a cognizable corporate interest, or assert representational standing 
on behalf of specific members who themselves suffered cognizable 
environmental harms to aesthetic or recreational interests.23 
Such representational standing was nothing new to the Supreme Court. 
The Court had previously recognized the standing of a trade association to 
represent its members,24 and the right of a public interest organization to 
assert the constitutional rights of its members to avoid discovery of 
membership lists in litigation.2s The Supreme Court in Sierra Club thus gave 
organizational environmental plaintiffs a key to the standing threshold: 
locate members who would have individual standing (as users of the 
affected environmental resource, for example) and base organizational 
standing on the representation of these members. The question, however, of 
l9 See id. at 727,728-3 1. 
20 Id. at 734. 
Id. at 739-40. 
22 Id. 
Id. at 738. Since Sierra Club, there have been no reported cases where environmental 
organizations have been successful in asserting their own, direct corporate interests in the 
environment to establish standing. The few reported cases have rejected attempts by 
environmental organizations to assert standing based on direct corporate interests. See Sierra 
Club v. SCM Corp., 747 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1984); Citizens for a Better Environment v. 
Caterpillar, Inc., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1053 (C.D. Ill. 1998). One court went so far as to suggest 
that the idea of a corporation (albeit a business corporation) asserting aesthetic injury of its 
own accord was "beyond the realm of legal fiction and belongs in the realm of poetic 
license." Citizens Coordinating Comm. on Friendship Heights v. Washington Metro. Area 
Transit Auth, 765 F.2d 1169, 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (citing MACLEISH COLLECTED POEMS 
1917-1952,22 (1952)). 
24 Nat'l Motor Freight Ass'n v. United States, 372 U.S. 246 (1963). 
'' NAACP v. Alabama. 357 U.S. 449,458-60 (1958). 
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exactly who may be designated as a "memberwz6 that an organization can 
represent was neither raised nor considered in the Sierra Club case. 
B, Hunt and the Representational Standing of Organizations 
Without Any Legal Members 
Hunt v. Washington Apple considered the organizational standing of a 
state-created commission, the Washington Apple Advertising Commission 
(Commission), which was fashioned to promote the state's apple growers.27 
All apple growers and dealers in Washington State were required to pay an 
assessment to support the Commission's activities; these same growers and 
dealers selected the members of the Commission, who were also growers 
and dealers.'* The Commission sued in 1974 to challenge certain apple 
packaging and labeling restrictions adopted by North ~arol ina, '~  which put 
Washington apple growers at a competitive disadvantage in the North 
Carolina market.30 The Commission alleged that these restrictions violated 
the dormant Commerce clause3' of the Constitution and were an unlawful 
restraint on interstate ~ommerce.~' 
The Supreme Court rejected a challenge to the Commission's 
organizational capacity to assert the interests of its constituent apple 
growers.33 In doing so, the Court specifically held that a collective entity 
need not have legally recognized "members"34 in order to assert 
26 TO reduce confusion, this article will use the term "member" to refer to persons formally 
recognized as members of an organization as that organization is constituted under governing 
state law. Individuals identified for standing purposes by an organization who are not legally 
"members" will be referred to as the organization's constituents, even though the 
organization may itself call them members. 
"Hunt, 432 U.S. at 336. 
Id. at 336-37. 
29 In 1973, North Carolina enacted a statute, which required all closed containers of apples 
sold, offered for sale, or shipped into the state to bear "no grade other than the applicable 
U.S. grade or standard." N.C. Gen. Stat. 5 106-189.1 (1973). 
30 Hunt, 432 U.S. at 337-39. 
" The Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine in United States case law limits the power of 
states to legislate in connection with interstate commerce. The Clause does not expressly 
exist in the text of the U.S. Constitution; it is a doctrine of congressional power inferred by 
the U.S. Supreme Court from the actual Commerce Clause in Article I, 5 8 of the 
Constitution. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824); H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 
336 U.S. 525 (1949). Article I, 5 8 authorizes Congress to "regulate commerce among the 
states." U.S. CONST. art. I, 5 8. 
32 Hunt, 432 U.S. at 339. 
33 Id. at 346. 
" Members may be those that elect members and are the only ones to serve on the 
Commission, and those that pay dues and finance activities. Id. at 334. 
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organizational standing; rather, the Court would look to whether the persons 
whose concrete interests were affected "possessed all of the indicia of 
membership in an ~r~anization."~' The Court therefore looked at the 
functions performed by the Commission, and concluded that "it has engaged 
in advertising, market research and analysis, public education campaigns, 
and scientific research" in support of promoting the Washington apple 
industry.36 The Court then concluded that the growers and dealers possessed 
the necessary "indicia of membership" akin to members of a traditional 
trade ass~ciation.~' The "indicia of membership" recited by the Supreme 
Court in Hunt included the facts that "[tlhey alone elect the members of the 
Commission; they alone may serve on the Commission; [and] they alone 
finance its activities, including the costs of this lawsuit, through assessments 
levied upon them."38 The fact that participation in the Commission was 
mandatory, not voluntary, for apple growers and dealers in Washington 
State, did not preclude organizational standing.39 According to the Court, 
this situation is no different than compulsory membership in a union or state 
bar association, as such organizations usually have representational 
standing.40 
Although Hunt adopts a functional equivalence test4' for determining 
whether an entity without members may assert representational standing for 
its constituents, the Court did not explicate the Article I11 interests served by 
these functions. Other Supreme Court cases, however, make these interests 
more explicit. The Court has repeatedly asserted that the purposes of the 
Article I11 standing inquiry include assuring that the plaintiff has "a personal 
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete 
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court 
3s Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
'' Id. at 34-4-45. 
39 Id. at 345. 
Id. (adopting the concept of "representational standing" by formulating the Hunt three-part 
test, see infra note 41). 
41 Id. at 333 ("[aln association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members when: (a) 
its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks 
to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted, nor 
the relief requested, requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit"). See 
also Roger Beers, Environmental Litigation Files, When Does a Membership Organization 
Have Standing?, http:/ /www.rbeerslaw.com/standing.htrnl#WhOa 
%20Membership%200rganization%20Have%2OStanding? (last visited Dec. 17,2005). 
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so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional 
questions . . . . 3 7 4 2  
Subsequent to Hunt, the Court in International Union v.  rock:^ 
rejected an invitation to reconsider the Hunt Court's broad embrace of 
organizational standing, and firther explained the rationale for 
organizational standing: 
The Secretary's presentation, however, fails to recognize the special 
features, advantageous both to the individuals represented and to the 
judicial system as a whole, that distinguish suits by associations on 
behalf of their members from class actions. While a class action 
creates an ad hoc union of injured plaintiffs who may be linked only 
by their common claims, an association suing to vindicate the 
interests of its members can draw upon a pre-existing reservoir or 
expertise and capital. "Besides financial resources, organizations 
often have specialized expertise and research resources relating to 
the subject matter of the lawsuit that individual plaintiffs lack." 
Note, From Net to Sword: Organizational Representatives 
Litigating Their Members' Claims, 1974 U. ILL. L. FORUM 663, 
669. These resources can assist both courts and plaintiffs. As one 
court observed of an association's role in pending litigation: "[The] 
interest and expertise of this plaintiff, when exerted on behalf of its 
directly affected members, assure 'that concrete adverseness which 
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely 
depends for illumination of difficult . . . questions."' Harlem Valley 
Transportation Assn. v. Stafford, 360 F. Supp. 1057, 1065 
(S.D.N.Y. 1973), quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,204 (1 962). 
In addition, the doctrine of associational standing recognizes that 
the primary reason people join an organization is often to create an 
effective vehicle for vindicating interests that they share with 
others.44 
Implicitly, for an organization to bring this necessary "concrete 
adverseness" to litigation, it must be sufficiently responsive to those of its 
constituents who have suffered an "injury in fact" and bring the same fill 
and zealous representation as the individuals would themsel~es.~~ Such 
responsiveness might certainly be accomplished by holding management 
42 Baker v. Can; 369 U.S. 186,204 (1962). 
43 477 U.S. 274 (1986). 
Id. at 282-83. 
45 Id. at 297. 
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(such as the governing board of the organization) subject to dismissal at the 
next election if the constituents are dissatisfied. As will be discussed later in 
this article, however, that is certainly not the only means of assuring 
organizational responsiveness to the constituents' interests. 
Thus, in Hunt and its progeny, the Supreme Court recognized 
representational standing for an organization without formal members as 
long as the traditional indicia of membership were present, but failed to spell 
out what the irreducible minimum of such indicia were. The Court held 
eligibility for service on the governing board, a vote for the board, and 
financing of the organization's activities, taken together, were 
Conspicuously absent from these factors was the voluntariness of the 
association. The Court also left unaddressed which of these factors were the 
bare minimum necessary conditions to representative capacity. 
C. Why Many Environmental Organizations Do Not Provide For a 
Voting Membership 
The extent to which Hunt established an irreducible minimum of 
membership indicia may be an important consideration in evaluating the 
standing of environmental non-governmental organizations that litigate to 
advance their environmental interests. Like the commission involved in 
Hunt, many such organizations lack formal members under state law.47 
Unlike Hunt, the supporting constituents of these organizations voluntarily 
associate with the organization. Also unlike Hunt, very often the supporting 
constituents of these organizations do not vote for the organization's 
directors; rather, the board of directors is self-sustaining and elects its own 
succe~sors .~~ 
There are several reasons why non-governmental advocacy 
organizations may prefer not to have a voting membership. Perhaps one 
issue is administrative convenience: having a voting membership imposes 
an extra level of administrative burden on the not-for-profit corporation, 
with requirements to conduct annual meetings and elections and provide 
formal legal notice of such meetings.49 Another perhaps more compelling 
46 Hunt, 432 U.S. at 34445. 
Id. at 333-34. 
48 Stephen G. Greene, Hostile Takeover or Rescue?, CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY, April 15, 
2004, at 24, available at http://philanthropy.codWarticles/v16/i13/ 13002401 .htm. 
49 See Health Research Group v. Kennedy, 82 F.R.D. 21, 24 (D.D.C. 1979) (organization 
citing "convenience" as reason for not having voting membership); see generally ABA 
SECTION OF BUSINESS LAW, NONPROFIT GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT 337-54 (V. Futter, 
ed. 2002) (noting that such burdens requiring an intrusion upon the organization's time 
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reason why organizations prefer not to have voting membership is the fear 
of a hostile takeoverS0 organized by institutions opposed to an organization's 
advocacy purpose.s' A recent example of this phenomenon can be seen in 
the 2004 hostile proxy battle conducted for control of the Sierra The 
proxy battle was instigated by political organizations opposed to 
imrnigrati~n.~' These groups sought to re-characterize immigration as an 
"environmental" issue and make an anti-immigration policy a formal part of 
the Sierra Club's organizational mission.54 In order to be an eligible voting 
member of the Sierra Club, a person need simply pay $25 to join;s5 Sierra 
Club estimated that approximately 8,000 new members signed up just to 
vote in the contested board ele~tion.'~ 
Any organization with an open membership structure and formal voting 
rights is susceptible to this sort of hostile attack. Environmental advocacy 
organizations may be particularly vulnerable given the nature of the issues 
they take on and the finances available to the institutions they oppose. 
Therefore, these groups have come up with a variety of means to respond to 
threats of outside attack. Some groups impose strict membership 
requirements, commanding a demonstration of commitment to the 
organizational cause before offering rnember~hi~.~' Other organizations 
allow only a limited number of board members to be nominated by the 
membership.s8 Yet another approach is to provide for two or more classes of 
include: electing a board of directors, approving governing structures and policies, and 
authorizing major transactions). 
Acquiring control of an organization by stock purchase or exchange of directors, which 
goes against the wishes of the target company's management and board of directors. 
InvestorWords.com, Definition, Hostile Takeover, http://www.investorwords.com/2344/ 
hostile-takeover.htm1 (last visited Dec. 20,2005). 
" See Greene, supra note 48. 
52 Id. The Sierra Club Web site can be found at http://www.sierraclub.org/. 
53 Greene, supra note 48. 
s4 Id. Although this particular attempt was unsuccessful, it has caused many organizations to 
reconsider their voting structure and their vulnerability to an organized attempt to hijack the 
organizational mission. Id. 
5s See Sierra Club, Join or Give, Join Online!, https://ww2.sierraclub.org/membership/ (last 
visited Dec. 17,2005). 
56 Greene, supra note 48. 
'' See, e.g., id. Greenpeace (Web site available at http://www.greenpeace.org/ international/) 
requires its members to have been active in its mission for at least six years as either staff or 
volunteer before they may become full members with voting rights. As a result, Greenpeace 
only has 66 voting members. Id. 
See, e.g., id. National Audubon Society (Web site available at http://www.audubon.org/) 
allows only six of its 36 directors to be nominated by the membership; the remainder is 
nominated by the Board and subject to ratification by the membership. Id. 
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membership, with voting rights restricted to a smaller class of members that 
have established their qualification.59 
For the aforementioned reasons, a formal membership structure with full 
voting rights is not the norm in environmental advocacy organizations. 
Indeed, one leading handbook for the governance and management of non- 
profit organizations questions whether the concept of membership is 
outdated, and concludes that: 
For most nonprofits serving humanity, the current thinking is to cast 
as wide a net as possible to further the cause and to communicate 
electronically with members and nonmembers alike. Supporting a 
membership, however, is expensive. Cutting-edge nonprofits, 
particularly mission-driven organizations, will rethink the value of 
membership to gain the competitive advantage in serving society.60 
If there is indeed a trend away from a full voting membership structure in 
"mission-driven" organizations, such as environmental advocacy 
organizations, then the judicial system will eventually have to decide 
whether such organizations without a voting membership can still establish 
the necessary indicia of a membership organization to qualify as litigating 
representatives of their  constituent^.^' 
11. INCONSISTENT JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF THE HW~INDICIA OF 
MEMBERSHIP" TEST TO ORGANIZATION VOTING RIGHTS 
AAer Hunt, a few judicial decisions addressed organizational standing in 
situations where there is either a non-existent or limited voting 
membership.62 Some courts have rejected any claim to representational 
standing on behalf of persons lacking voting membership rights,63 while 
other courts have found there to be "de facto" membership with little or no 
59 See, e.g., NRDC v. Costle, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17298, at **12-13 (D.D.C. 1980) 
(Natural Resources Defense Council consists of "two classes of members; they are: (a) 
regular members who elect themselves to office as NRDC's 'Board of Trustees' and who 
authorized the bringing of this suit, and (b) general members who receive newsletters, 
p g r e s s  reports, annual reports, etc."). 
ABA S E C ~ O N  OF B u s m ~ s s  LAW, supra note 49, at 353-54. 
6' See, e.g., NRDC, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17298, at **12-13. 
See, e.g., Sierra Club v. ALCOA, 585 F. Supp. 842 (N.D.N.Y. 1984). 
See Am. Legal Found. v. FCC, 808 F.2d 84 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Health Research Group, 82 
F.R.D. 2 1. 
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discussion of the extent of members' voting rights.64 Some of the more 
interesting decisions are unpublished, adding to the practitioner's difficulty 
in making sense of this area of the law? A review of these decisions taken 
together indicates that courts generally require some level of influence over 
the advocacy decisions of the organization by the standing members, but 
that actual voting control may not be necessary.66 
A. Early Rejection of Organizational Standing for Non-Voting 
"Supporters" by the District of Columbia Circuit 
Two early decisions handed down by the District of Columbia Circuit 
emphatically rejected attempts by non-membership organizations to assert 
representational standing.67 Although neither of these cases arose in the 
environmental context, they illustrate one approach to the issue of 
organizational standing. American Legal Foundation v. F c C ~ ~  represents an 
extreme example. American Legal Foundation (ALF) sued the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC), arguing that the FCC improperly 
failed to pursue allegations that the ABC Television Network violated the 
fairness doctrine by presenting biased reporting of alleged improper 
activities by the Central Intelligence ~ g e n c ~ . ~ '  ALF claimed to sue on 
behalf of all television viewers who watched ABC News, and submitted 
affidavits from several ABC viewers who expressed their support for the 
ALF suit.70 As recited by the decision, 
ALF has no members. In fact, the Foundation's corporate charter 
expressly prohibits it from having any. . . . Instead of claiming to 
speak for a discrete membership body, ALF purports to represent 
the interests of all members of the public who regularly watch ABC 
News (and other network news broadcasts). ALF submitted three 
64 See Pac. Legal Found. v. Gorsuch, 13 ELR 20,105 (9th Cir. Oct. 20, 1982) (holding that 
PLF lacked standing because "it [did] not allege that any of its directors, members, 
supporters, or contributors has authorized or asked it to represent them in the suit"). 
See, e.g., id. (although published in advance sheets as 690 F.2d 725 (9th Cir. 1982). the 
decision was subsequently withdrawn from publication and does not appear in any bound 
volume. See infra note 97 for further explanation on the decision not to publish). See also 
Roger Beers, supra note 41, at http:Nwww.rbeerslaw.com~standing.html#When%2ODoes 
%20a%20Membership%200rganization%20Have%2OStanding?. 
66 See discussion infra Part 1I.B. 
67 See Am. Legal Found., 808 F.2d 84; Health Research Group, 82 F.R.D. 21. 
808 F.2d 84. 
69 Id. at 85. 
70 Id. at 88. 
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affidavits to the Commission to buttress its claim that the 
Foundation represents the views of at least some ABC viewers." 
The Court of Appeals found this definition of ALF's representative 
capacity to be far too broad and lacking any definable limit.72 Accordingly, 
after discussing the Hunt Court's "indicia of membership" factors,73 the DC 
Circuit emphatically rejected ALF's claim to organizational standing: 
ALF's relationship to its "supporters" bears none of the indicia of a 
traditional membership organization discussed in Hunt. With its 
broadly defined mission as a "media watchdog," ALF serves no 
discrete, stable group of persons with a definable set of common 
interests. To the contrary, ALF's constituency of supporters is 
completely open-ended; ALF could, consistent with this 
"institutional commitment," purport to serve all who read 
newspapers, watch television, or listen to the radio. Furthermore, it 
does not appear from the record that ALF's "supporters" play any 
role in selecting ALF's leadership, guiding ALF's activities, or 
financing those activities. Finally, we can discern no linkage 
between ALF's interest in the outcome of this kind of litigation and 
those of its supporters.74 
The rejection of ALF's organizational standing is hardly surprising, 
given the lack of any discernable membership criteria other than the near- 
universal category of network television viewers, and the lack of any 
voluntary affiliation or common interest on the part of those ALF claimed to 
represent.75 In ALF, the purported standing members were not even 
identified as contributors to the organization.76 Not only were these 
"supporters" lacking in any sort of organizational influence or 
they lacked even the financing element that the Hunt Court found so 
important.78 
More troubling for representational standing of non-membership 
corporations, is an earlier decision by the D.C. Circuit that rejected 
organizational standing of a non-membership corporation even when it 
7 1  Id. 
72 Id. at 90. 
73 Hunt, 432 U.S. at 333; see also supra note 41. 
74 Am. Legal Found., 808 F.2d at 90. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 Hunt, 432 U.S. at 344-45. 
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sought to represent the interests of its contributors. In Health Research 
Group v. ~ e n n e d ~ , ' ~  the D.C. Circuit rejected such standing based on its 
application of the Hunt "indicia of membership"g0 tesL8' The court 
recognized that the plaintiff organization received financing for its activities 
from the persons whose interests it asserted for standing, and that 
"individual supporters and contributors 'influence [the organization's] 
activities through their financial support and their letter writing."'82 
Nevertheless, the court focused on the lack of formal voting rights that the 
supporters of the corporate plaintiff possessed.83 
According to the Health Research Group (HRG) court, effective control 
over the organization's advocacy efforts was the touchstone of the Hunt test: 
Members, as the Court implicitly acknowledged in Hunt, normally 
exercise a substantial measure of power or control over an 
organization which, in typical circumstances, they themselves have 
created. In Hunt, "the indicia of membership" were present because 
the growers and dealers alone elected the members of the 
Commission, served as members of the Commission, and financed 
its activities . . . . 
Absent this element of control, there is simply no assurance that 
the party seeking judicial review represents the injured Party, and 
not merely a well-informed point of view. Ultimately, unless an 
organization truly represents an injured party, its position will not be 
meaningfully different from that of the environmental organization 
in Sierra Club v. Morton which sought standing as a "representative 
of the 
After considering that the directors of HRG were appointed by a director, 
and that all litigation and advocacy decisions were made by HRG 
employees, the court found insufficient control over the organization to 
satis@ its reading of the Hunt requirements for organizational standing.85 
79 82 F.R.D. 21. 
Hunt, 432 U.S. at 333; supra note 41. 
" Health Research Group, 82 F.R.D. at 28. 
Id. at 24. 
Id. at 27. 
Id. at 26-27. 
Id. at 28. 
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B. Mixed Decisions Applying Voting Control Tests in Environmental Cases 
Organizational plaintiffs in environmental cases have fared somewhat 
better than the advocacy groups in the pair of District of Columbia cases. An 
early Ninth Circuit decision, subsequently withdrawn from publication, 
3, 86 rejected an organization's claim to represent its "supporters ; however, the 
circumstances of this decision and its withdrawal fiom publication make it 
tenuous precedent. In more recent years, courts have recognized "de facto" 
membership organizations for standing purposes, with varying degrees of 
inquiry into the level of control exerted by the standing members over the 
organization's management.87 One district court rejected any requirement 
that the subclass of members who would have standing in a particular case 
be large enough to exert effective control over the organization.88 Another 
district court explicitly recognized standing of an organization to represent 
its supporters even in the absence of any membership voting rights.89 Still, 
despite this precedent, recent decisions continue to reject organizational 
environmental standing in the absence of traditional membership voting 
rights.g0 
1. Ninth Circuit Case Reiects Or~anizational Standing for Pacific 
Legal Foundation. but Keevs it a Secret 
One early and inscrutable case, Pacific Legal Foundation v.  ors such^' 
rejected an environmental group'sg2 attempt to assert standing on behalf of 
its "members, supporters, and  contributor^."^^ Pacific Legal Foundation 
(PLF) sued the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Administrator 
under the citizens suit provision of the Clean Air ~ c t , "  alleging that the 
Administrator neglected a mandatory duty to impose a state implementation 
86 Pac. Legal Found., 13 ELR 20,105. 
"See infra Part II.B.2. 
88 ALCOA, 585 F. Supp. 842. 
89 Cal. Sportfishing Prot. Alliance v. Diablo Grande, Inc., 209 F. Supp. 2d 1059 (E.D. Cal. 
2002). 
See Upper Chattahoochee Riverkeeper Fund, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 986 F. Supp. 1406 
(N.D. Ga. 1997); Basel Action Network v. Maritime Admin., 370 F. Supp. 2d 57, 68-70 
(D.C. Cir. 2005). 
'' 13 ELR 20,105. 
92 Although PLF asserted environmental claims in this suit, a visit to the organization's Web 
site reveals that it is not now, and never was, organized to promote environmental protection. 
See PLF, Rescuing Liberty From the Grasp of Government, http://www.pacificlegal.orgl (last 
visited Nov. 6, 2005). This suggests the possibility that the litigation was commenced 
collusively to make law limiting organizational standing. 
'' Pac. Legal Found., 13 ELR at *20,107. 
Clean Air Act 4 304,42 U.S.C. 7604. 
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plan on the State of California. The plaintiffs claimed that imposing the plan 
would have prevented California from losing its federal highway funding.95 
The Ninth Circuit rejected PLF's standing to assert these claims, noting that: 
All of the [PLFIys trustees, members, supporters, and contributors 
are, so far as this case is concerned, anonymous. None of them is 
alleged to have authorized the [PLF] to represent his or her personal, 
direct interests in this case. If any of them "can show 'injury in fact' 
resulting from the action which they seek to have the court 
adjudicate," . . . he or she is not identified, nor is he or she shown to 
have authorized the [PLF] to represent him or her in making such a 
showing. They simply are not here.96 
Thus, PLF failed to identifL any individual members to support its standing 
claim, and the case was subsequently withdrawn from publication.97 
Therefore, it was hardly surprising when another circuit court similarly 
rejected the Sierra Club's claim of organizational standing where the Sierra 
Club refused to identify at least one member with standing.98 Other parties 
95 The state implementation plan requirement appears at 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a). Somewhat 
paradoxically, PLF's suit also claimed a violation of the Constitution's guaranty of a 
republican form of government, U.S. CONST. art. IV, 9 4, in that "unelected" EPA officials 
were forcing political decisions upon the State of California. 
%Pat. Legal Found., 13 ELR at *20108. 
97 Footnote 5 of the ALCOA case lends an explanation as to why Pac. Legal Found. v. 
Gorsuch was never published. After the court cited to Pac. Legal Found., 690 F.2d 725 (9th 
Cir. 1982), the court noted that 
The citation to Pacific Legal Foundation raise[d] an interesting problem. Counsel 
for Alcoa advised the Court in a footnote to its memorandum that "[tlhat 
decision. . . appeared in West Reporting Service's Advance Sheets, but has been 
omitted from the bound volume. Upon telephoning the Office of the Clerk of the 
Ninth Circuit, Alcoa's counsel was instructed that the Pacific Legal Foundation 
decision stands as the law of the Ninth Circuit and may be cited for precedent." 
Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 8-9 n.**. An 
Editor's Note appearing at page 725 of volume 690 of West's Federal Reporter 2d 
Series states: "The opinion of the United States Court of Appeal [sic], Ninth Circuit 
in Pacific Legal Foundation v. Gorsuch published in the advance sheet at this 
citation, 690 F.2d 725-731, was withdrawn from bound volume at the request of the 
' court." In the interest of accuracy, this Court contacted the chambers of Judge 
Duniway, author of the Pacifc Legal Foundation panel decision. Judge Duniway 
advised that the decision is not to be cited as bindingprecedent of the Ninth Circuit 
in light of that court's determination to withdraw the decision. Accordingly, this 
Court feels justified in attributing little precedential weight to the result reached in 
that case. 
ALCOA, 585 F. Supp. at 842 n.5. 
98 SCM Corp.. 747 F.2d 99. 
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have since cited the Pacific Legal Foundation case in support of a broader 
argument for membership voting control,99 but with little success. 
2. Northern District of New York Reiects a "Control Test" in 
Sierra Club v. ALCOA 
In its Clean Water ~c t " '  citizen suit against Aluminum Company of 
America (ALCOA),"' the Sierra Club did not make the same mistake it did 
in its earlier cases against  ort ton'" and SCM."~ This time Sierra Club 
identified 55 individual members who lived near and recreated in the waters 
affected by ALCOA's pollution.'" Citing the withdrawn Pacific Legal 
Foundation opinion, however, ALCOA argued that the affected members 
lacked sufficient control over the organization, which had 340,000 voting 
members, to permit Sierra Club to assert representational standing.'05 
The court rejected this attack on Sierra Club's representational capacity, 
but in doing so, the court implicitly endorsed the concept that represented 
members exercising some form of voting control over the organization's 
management was requisite to organizational standing. According to the 
court, 
[slimply because the members who are affected by defendant's 
activities represent but a small segment of the Sierra Club's 
membership does not entitle defendant to belittle or demean these 
members' ability to assert control over their organization. The Sierra 
Club is indeed "totally a creature of the parties it purports to 
represent," . . . at least to the extent it is an organization founded 
upon participation and involvement by its members. The fact that 
members, to the extent possible, retain effective control over the 
direction the Club chooses to pursue distinguishes it significantly 
from the organization described by Judge Sirica in Health Research 
Group. '06 
The ALCOA case thus implies that voting rights are a sine qua non 
element of those members on whose behalf an organization would assert 
99 See ALCOA, 585 F. Supp. at 842. 
'O0 33 U.S.C. $5 1251-1387 (2000). 
lo' See ALCOA, 585 F. Supp. 842. 
Io2 In Sierra Club, 405 U.S. 727. 
lo' In SCM C o p ,  747 F.2d 99. 
I W  ALCOA, 585 F. Supp. at 851-52. 
'05 Id. at 849-50. 
'"Id. at 851. 
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standing. At the same time, the holding suggests that those members with 
standing need not have anything close to majority voting status within the 
organization; indeed, a small minority of members  suffice^.'^' For the 
ALCOA court, membership voting rights were more important than actual 
organizational control-this holding seems at odds with the approach of the 
Hunt Court, which refused to elevate form over substance, and looked to the 
actual control of an agency that had no legal members.'08 Nevertheless, the 
ALCOA holding seems to indicate that voting rights without control are 
sufficient to satisfy the Hunt "indicia of membership" test.Io9 
a. Eastern District of California Accepts Standing on Behalf of Members 
Without Voting Rights in California Sportfishing Protection Alliance 
At least one court has held that as long as an organizational plaintiff 
legally has members, the Hunt "indicia of membership" has no application, 
and the organization may assert representational standing on behalf of its 
legal members. In California Sportfshing Protection Alliance v. Diablo 
Grande, Inc.,"O the plaintiff organization of sportfishers brought a Clean 
Water Act citizen suit"' against a developer responsible for stormwater 
discharges.'I2 The defendant developer challenged the Alliance's standing, 
claiming that "Plaintiffs individual members have no ability to influence 
Plaintiffs decisions in Clean Water Act  lawsuit^.""^ The Eastern District of 
California rejected this challenge, reasoning that an organization that is 
formally organized as a membership corporation under state law does not 
need to satisfy Hunt's "indicia of membership" test; its representational 
capacity was auto ma ti^."^ According to the court, 
[pllaintiff brings suit here on behalf of its associate members such 
as CSPA Chairman Bill Jennings; no non-member individuals' 
claims are alleged in the Complaint. See Complaint; Doc.48, Exh.S, 
p.2 ("Any person who pays the annual individual membership dues 
to this corporation, as prescribed by the Board of Directors, shall be 
an Associate Member."). Defendant presents no evidence Plaintiff is 
not a traditional voluntary membership organization. The "indicia of 
lo' See, e.g., id. 
'08 Hunt, 432 U.S. at 333-34. 
Io9 See id. (describing the "indicia of membership" test). 
"O 209 F. Supp. 2d 1059. 
'I' Under 33 U.S.C. 5 1365. 
See Cal. Sportjishing Prot. Alliance, 209 F .  Supp. 2d 1059. 
"'Id. at 1065. 
Id. at 1066. 
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membership" test is not applicable. Defendant presents no evidence 
that at least one of CSPA's members would not have standing to sue 
in his own right.''' 
The California Sportfishing approach presents the converse of Hunt's 
form over substance test for organizational standing: as long as the 
organization is legally chartered as a membership organization, actual 
voting rights or control is not relevant to the representational standing 
inquiry.'16 However, California Sportfishing would certainly suggest that 
voting rights are not an absolute requisite for organizational standing, going 
a step farther than the ALCOA court's holding that voting control was not 
necessary.' I' 
b. Several Circuits Have Recognized "De Facto" Membership Organizations 
Despite Lack of Formal Organizational Membership 
Following the Hunt preference for form over substance, several courts 
have rejected standing challenges for organizations that legally lacked 
members in environmental cases."* In some cases, these holdings were 
almost entirely bereft of analysis. For example, in Upper Chattahoochee 
Riverkeeper Fund v. City of ~ t l a n t a , " ~  the court simply recited, without 
39120 discussion, that the plaintiff was a "de facto membership corporation. In 
Public Interest Research Group v. Magnesium Elektron, Inc.,12' the Third 
Circuit rejected a challenge to the plaintiffs capacity to assert 
organizational standing on the grounds that Public Interest Research 
Group's (PIRG) charter prohibits it from having members.'22 In so doing, 
the court referred to Hunt for the proposition that "to meet the requirements 
of organizational standing, PIRG . . . need only prove that their members 
possess the 'indicia of membership' in their organizations. ,3123 
p~~ p 
115 Id. 
116 State not-for-profit corporation law may limit, however, an organization's ability to create 
membership classes without voting rights. See infra Part 1V.A. 
117 See supra Part II.B.2. 
See Public Interest Research Group v. Magnesium Elektron, Inc., 123 F.3d 1 1 1  (3d Cir. 
1997); Upper Chattahoochee Riverkeeper, 986 F .  Supp. 1406. 
986 F. Supp. 1406. 
I2O Id. at 1409. 
I2l 123 F.3d 1 1  1 .  
lZ2 Id. at 125. 
12' Id. at 1 19 (citing the Hunt test, Hunt, 432 U.S. at 333). Although the Third Circuit rejected 
the challenge to PIRG's organizational capacity to sue on behalf of its members, it went on to 
find that PIRG's members themselves lacked the "injury in fact" necessary to support 
standing, as the District Court had specifically found that the defendants' violatio'ns caused 
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In Friends of the Earth v. Chevron Chemical ~ o m ~ a n ~ , ' ~ ~  the Fifth 
Circuit provided the most considered application of the "de facto 
membership" concept to environmental organizational standing.12' In . 
Friends of the Earth, Friends of the Earth (FOE) brought a citizen suit for 
penalties and injunctive relief for Chevron's violation of its Clean Water Act 
permit.126 Chevron challenged FOE'S standing, alleging that as a matter of 
District of Columbia law (where FOE was incorporated), FOE legally had 
no members as the organization had failed to adopt by-laws establishing 
classes and qualifications of membership and voting rights.12' Instead of 
formal membership criteria, FOE simply considered any person who 
donated money, or who had money donated in their name, to be a 
,9128 
"member. The lower court dismissed FOE'S suit on this basis, reasoning 
that in the absence of legal members, FOE could not assert organizational 
standing. 129 
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed, specifically recognizing the 
concept of a "de facto membership" organization that satisfies the requisites 
of representational standing despite the lack of members recognized as a 
matter of corporation law.I3' The court noted that the Supreme Court in 
Hunt had rejected exactly that sort of formalistic analysis of organizational 
capacity in favor of a more substantive "indicia of membership" test.I3' The 
court applied the Hunt test to the organizational structure of FOE and found 
it sufficient: 
The Court in Hunt looked to who elected the governing body of the 
organization and who financed its activities. The purported 
members of FOE meet both these elements. Additionally, the 
members have voluntarily associated themselves with FOE, in 
contrast to the apple growers who financed the Commission through 
mandatory assessments. The individuals testified in court that they 
no harm to the environment. Id. at 119-23. The Supreme Court subsequently rejected this 
approach to the "injury in fact" element of standing in environmental cases. Friends of the 
Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Serv., 528 U.S. 167 (2000) (holding that the injury in fact element is 
satisfied by an injury to the plaintiffs' environmental interests, whether or not there is a 
perceptible injury to the environment). 
24 129 F.3d 826 (5th Cir. 1997). 
L25 Id. 
Id. at 826. 
12' Id. at 827. 
lZ8 Id. 
'29 Friends of the Earth v. Chevron Chemical Co.. 919 F. Supp. 1042 (E.D. Tex. 1996). 
I3O Frienak of the Earth, 129 F.3d at 829. 
13' Id. 
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were members of FOE. FOE has a clearly articulated and 
understandable membership structure. This suit clearly is within 
FOE's central purpose, and thus within the scope of reasons that 
individuals joined the organization.13' 
The Friends of the Earth court also rejected formal membership under 
corporation law as a prerequisite to organizational standing.133 At the same 
time, the court explicitly assumed that voting rights are part of the necessary 
"indicia of membership" under the Hunt test, in effect looking to "who 
,3134 elected the governing body of the organization. The court did not seem 
to examine too closely the relationship between voting rights and those 
members identified for standing purposes before the court; nor did the court 
inquire whether anyone who had ever given money to FOE was given an 
annual ballot to vote for directors.13' The court, as an additional factor not 
present in ~ u n t , ' ~ ~  noted that the members of the plaintiff organization 
voluntarily associated themselves with the ~rganization.'~' 
c. District Court Decision in USPIRG v. Bayou steel13* Implicitly Rejects 
Voting Rights as a Prerequisite to Organizational Standing 
There is one unreported decision that upholds organizational standing 
for an organization that made no claim that it provided voting rights to its 
constituents. In united States Public Interest Research Group v. Bayou 
the Eastern District of Louisiana considered the organizational 
capacity of United States Public Interest Research Group (USPIRG) to 
assert standing on behalf of its contributors, even though its Articles of 
Incorporation specifically provided that "the Corporation shall have no 
7,140 members. Like FOE, USPIRG consistently treated all those who 
13* Id. 
'33 Id. at 826. 
I" Id. at 829 (applying the Hunt test). 
13' There is no suggestion in the briefs filed by FOE in the F i f i  Circuit that FOE's members 
actually voted for directors of the organization. See Appellant's Brief, Friends of the Earth, 
129 F.3d 826 (5th Cir. Jan. 30, 1997) (No. 96-40590), 1997 WL 33572771; Appellant's Reply 
Brief, Friends of the Earth, 129 F.3d 826, (5th Cir. Apr. 09, 1997) (No. 9640590), 1997 WL 
33572768. 
'36 Hunt. 432 U.S. at 342 (noting that the commission is not a voluntary organization). 
13' Friends of the Earth, 129 F.3d at 829. 
13' United States Public Interest Research Group v. Bayou Steel, Inc., Civ. No. 96-0432, slip 
o . (E.D. La. Sept. 12,1997) (on file with author). 18 .J 
la. 
Although USPIRG subsequently amended its Articles of Incorporation to provide for a 
class of members, even with the amendment the charter provided for no membership voting 
rights: "The corporation shall have one class of members, who shall have no voting rights." 
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contributed to its organization as members.14' Applying Hunt's indicia of 
membership approach broadly, the Eastern District of Louisiana concluded 
that "USPIRG [has] provided a means of expressing the collective views of 
its members and protected their collective interests in environmental issues," 
and accordingly held that USPIRG had representational standing in its Clean 
Air Act suit against Bayou ~ t e e 1 . I ~ ~  
The Bayou Steel opinion does not explicitly consider whether 
USPIRG's de facto members had voting rights; however, the briefing before 
the court makes clear that they did not.143 Thus, contrary to the District of 
Columbia decisions in Health Research G ~ O U ~ ' ~ ~  and American Legal 
~ounda t i on , ' ~~  the Eastern District of Louisiana apparently determined that 
voting rights are not the sine qua non of organizational standing, and 
concluded that an organization could nonetheless serve as the collective 
advocate for persons who were its  contributor^.'^^ 
d. DDC Rejects Standing for Non-membership Organization in Base1 
Action Network v. Maritime AdministratorI4' 
Still, Bayou Steel is not the last word of the federal district courts on the 
necessity of voting control to establish environmental associational standing. 
In Basel Action Network v. Maritime ~dministrator , '~~ the District Court for 
the District of Columbia again rejected representational standing asserted by 
a plaintiff organization who gave no voting or control rights to those injured 
individuals it sought to represent.149 The Base1 Action Network (BAN) sued 
to challenge a determination by the U.S. Maritime Administrator to dispose 
Memorandum of Plaintiff in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss at 5, Bayou Steel, Inc., Civ. 
- - 
No. 96-0432 (E.D. La. Sept. 12,-i997) (on file with author). 
I4l  Id. 
142 Id. 
143 Plaintiffs Brief, Bayou Steel, Inc., Civ. No. 96-0432, slip op. (E.D. La. Sept. 12, 1997) 
(on file with author). 
I" 82 F.R.D. 21. 
14' 808 F.2d 84. 
Bayou Steel, Inc., Civ. No. 96-0432. While this decision appears on its face to contradict 
the Health Research Group approach, the underlying facts developed by Bayou Steel may 
have served to distinguish USPIRG's relationship to its members from that of HRG. The 
represented "members" claimed by HRG had done nothing more, apparently, than to have 
donated money to HRG's afiliate, Public Citizen. USPIRG, on the other hand, established 
that it maintained close communications with its members, including personal visits, surveys, 
calls, and written communications. Bayou Steel, Civ. No. 96-0432. 
147 370 F. Supp. 2d 57. 
14' 370 F. Supp. 2d 57. 
149 Id. at 70. 
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of a fleet of World War I1 era cargo vessels by selling them for transfer to a 
ship-wrecker in Great ~ritain.'" BAN claimed to represent the interests of 
fishermen and other recreational users of the Chesapeake ~ a ~ . ' ' '  As in the 
earlier Health Research Group case,ls2 the organizational structure of the 
BAN was somewhat complex, as BAN was a "Sub-project" of an 
organization known as the Tides center.lS3 Tides Center was incorporated as 
a not-for-profit corporation, with articles of incorporation that specifically 
provided that the corporation would have no members.Is4 
In analyzing BAN'S standing claim, the district court considered the 
Tides Project to be the real party in interest, and determined that, without 
effective control over the management of the corporation by those 
individuals the corporation sought to represent as "members," the plaintiff 
could not satisfy Hunt S "indicia of membership" test."' The court explicitly 
found the control element as part of the irreducible minimum of the Hunt 
test: 
Three main characteristics must be present for an entity to meet the 
test of functional equivalency . . . it must represent .individuals that 
have all the "indicia of membership" including (i) electing the 
entity's leadership (ii) serving in the entity, and (iii) financing the 
entity's activities; and (3) its fortunes must be tied closely to those 
of its const i t~enc~. ' '~  
Citing the D.C. Circuit's American Legal Foundation decision,"' the court 
noted that "[tlhere is no evidence that the Projects or Sub-projects exercise 
any control over the organizational direction of the Tides Center. ,3158 
Accordingly, the court rejected BAN'S claim of representational standing.Is9 
''O Id. at 60-61. 
Id. 
lS2 82 F.R.D. 21. 
Is' Basel Action Network, 370 F. Supp. 2d at 60-61. 
I" Id. at 68-70. 
IS' Id. 
Is6 Id. at 69-70 (citing Fund Democracy v. SEC, 278 F.3d 21 (D.C. Cir. 2002)). 
Is' ~ m .  Legal Found., 808 F.2d at 84. 
'" Bare1 Action Network, 370 F. Supp. 2d at 70. 
Id. (determining that co-plaintiff Sierra Club did have associational standing, the court 
proceeded to determine the merits of the case). 
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C. Oregon Advocacy center16' and stincerI6': 
the Advisory Board Line of Cases 
Well outside the context of environmental standing, another string of 
cases has held that "advisory boards" may be used to establish the functional 
equivalent of membership for organizational standing purposes.162 Such 
advisory boards may suffice even where none of the represented class of 
persons has the right to vote for the organization's board. These cases arise 
under federal legislation that affirms the standing of such organizations: in 
1986, Congress enacted the Protection and Advocacy for Mentally I11 
Individuals A C ~ ' ~ ~  (PAMII) "to ensure that the rights of individuals with 
,3164 
mental illness are protected and "to assist States to establish and operate 
a protection and advocacy system for individuals with mental illness which 
will protect and advocate the rights of such individuals through activities to 
ensure the enforcement of the Constitution and Federal and State 
statutes."165 The PAMII Act recognizes and provides support to state- 
chartered "advocacy systems," which may be either independent state 
agencies or private not-for-profit entities.166 To be eligible for financial 
support as an advocacy system, PAM11 requires the organization to establish 
an advisory council on which "at least 60 percent [of] the membership . . . 
shall be comprised of individuals who have received or are receiving mental 
health services or who are family members of such individuals. 9,167 
addition, the "governing board" of an advocacy organization under PAMII 
must consist of "members who broadly represent or are knowledgeable 
,3168 
about the needs of the clients served by the system. The system is 
specifically authorized to include members who "have received or are 
receiving mental health services and family members of such 
individuals. ,9169 
I* Or. Advocacy Ctr. v. Mink, 322 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2003). 
16' Doe v. Stincer, 175 F.3d 879 (1 lth Cir. 1999). 
16' See Stincer, 175 F.3d 879; Or. Advocacy Ctr., 322 F.3d 1101; and the cases discussed 
infra note 176, below. 
16' Pub. L. No. 99-319, 100 Stat. 478 (1986). For a history of PAM11 and associated statutes 
supporting protection and advocacy systems for mentally ill and developmentally disabled 
persons, see generallv M. Bowman, Note, Open Debate Over Closed Doors: The Effect of the 
New Developmental Disabilities Regulations on Protection and Advocacy Programs, 85 KY. 
L.J. 955 (1998). 
42 U.S.C. 5 10801(b)(l). 
16' Id. at 5 10801(b)(2)(A). 
Id. at 5 10804 (a)(l). 
16' Id. at 10805(a)(6)(B). 
Id. at 5 10805(c)(l)(B)(ii). 
'69 Id. at 5 10805(a)(6)(B). 
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Under PAMII, an advocacy organization for the mentally disabled has 
the authority to "pursue administrative, legal, and other appropriate 
remedies to ensure the protection of individuals with mental illness who are 3,170 receiving care or treatment in the State, and "pursue administrative, 
legal, and other appropriate remedies on behalf of an individual who . . . was 
an individual with a mental illness."171 Congress thus contemplated in 
PAMII the existence, in at least some states, of litigation involving advocacy 
organizations that may not have formal membership, and which might have 
advisory boards that include some (but by no means a majority) of the 
constituent persons with mental illness. As predicted, the federal courts were 
asked to address the organizational standing of such member-less 
organizations. 
One early case rejected the standing of such organizations, specifically 
on the grounds that the constituents the organization sought to represent had 
none of the "indicia of membership" established in Hunt.172 In Association 
of Retarded Citizens v. Dallas County Mental Health & Retardation Center 
Board of ~ r u s t e e s , ' ~ ~  the Fifth Circuit reasoned that such an advocacy 
organization lacked standing because the individual whose interests the 
organization sought to represent was "not a 'member"' of the plaintiff 
organization, and "the organization [bore] no relationship to traditional 
membership groups because most of its 'clients'-handicapped and disabled 
people-[were] unable to participate in and guide the organization's 
 effort^.""^ In formulating its decision, the Fifth Circuit determined that 
effective participatory control in the plaintiff organization by its constituents 
was essential to organizational standing.175 
Most jurisdictions, however, have taken a more expansive view of 
organizational standing for PAMII advocacy  organization^.'^^ In Stincer, the 
I7O Id. at 5 10805(a)(l)(B). 
17' Id. at 5 10805(a)(l)(C)(i). 
See Ass'n of Retarded Citizens of Dallas v. Dallas County Mental Health & Mental 
Retardation Ctr. Bd. of Trustees, 19 F.3d 241 (5th Cir. 1994). 
173 Id. 
174 Id. at 244. 
175 Id. 
17' The seminal case is Stincer, 175 F.3d 879. Other decisions finding organizational standing 
to advocacy organizations under PAM11 include Brown v. Stone, 66 F. Supp. 2d 412,422-23 
(E.D.N.Y. 1999); Tenn. Prot. and Advocacy Serv., Inc. v. Bd. of Education of Putnam 
County, 24 F. Supp. 2d 808,814 (M.D. Tenn. 1998); Rubenstein v. Benedictine Hospital, 790 
F. Supp. 396 (N.D.N.Y. 1992); Mich. Prot. and Advocacy Serv., Inc. v. Babin, 799 F. Supp. 
695,702 n.12 (E.D. Mich. 1992); Prot. & Advocacy, Inc. v. Murphy, No. 90 C 569,1992 WL 
59100, *I0 (N.D. Ill. 1992); Goldstein v. Coughlin, 83 F.R.D. 613,614 (W.D.N.Y. 1979). 
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Eleventh Circuit specifically rejected the Association of Retarded Citizens 
case.'77 In doing so, the Eleventh Circuit took a broad view of Hunt's 
"indicia of membership" test, finding it to be satisfied by the constituents' 
means to communicate to and influence the organization: 
[Plrotection and advocacy organizations must have advisory 
councils, sixty percent of whose membership as well as the chair of 
the council must be "comprised of individuals who have received or 
are receiving mental health services or who are family members of 
such individuals." [42 U.S.C.] 5 10805(a)(6)(B), (C); 42 C.F.R. 
6 5 1.23(b)(l), (2). Additionally, PAMII provides that a protection 
and advocacy organization must afford the public with an 
opportunity to comment on the priorities and activities of the 
protection and advocacy system and must establish a grievance 
procedure for clients. . . . Much like members of a traditional 
association, the constituents of the Advocacy Center possess the 
means to influence the priorities and activities the Advocacy Center 
undertakes.' " 
The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that "the fact that the Advocacy Center [had] 
constituents rather than members does not deprive it of Article I11 
,9179 standing. Notably, the court did not seem to consider the question 
whether the "constituents" of the plaintiff had any voting rights.Ia0 
The Ninth Circuit adopted Stincer and expanded upon its reasoning in 
another case under PAMII, Oregon Advocacy Center v.  ink.'^' Like the 
state defendants in Stincer, the Oregon State Hospital (whose failure to 
provide facilities to mentally ill criminal defendants was challenged) argued 
that the lack of some form of voting control by the organization's 
constituents precluded representational standing: 
'77 Stincer, 175 F.3d 879 (rejecting Ass 'n of Retarded Citizens, 19 F.3d 241). 
17' Stincer, 175 F.3d at 886. 
'79 Id. at 885. 
Paradoxically, the Eleventh Circuit in Stincer ultimately held that the Advocacy Center 
had failed to establish standing because it failed to identify a particular constituent who had 
suffered."injury in fact." Id. at 887. Despite earlier language in the opinion stating that "Nor 
must the association name the members on whose behalf suit is brought" to establish 
representational capacity of an organization, id. at 882, the court apparently reasoned that 
identification of such an individual member was still necessary to establish that an individual 
member would have standing in their own right, as required by Hunt. 
"' 322 F.3d 1101. Stincer was also adopted and followed by the District of Maine in Risinger 
v. Concannon, 117 F. Supp. 2d 61 (D. Me. 2000). 
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Put in starkest terms, OSH's membership argument is that because 
"individuals with mental illness [do not] actually control OAC's 
activities and finances," OAC cannot claim standing to represent 
their interests. In constitutional terms, the essence of OSH's position 
is that without a direct membership linkage to incapacitated 
defendants, OAC cannot rely on injuries to those mentally ill 
defendants to meet the injury in fact requirement and establish the 
personal stake in the outcome of the litigation that the Constitution 
demands. i82 
In rejecting these arguments, the Ninth Circuit carefully considered the 
import of clear Congressional intent that advocacy organizations under 
PAM11 have standing to sue.183 The court reasoned that since the first prong 
of the Hunt test for organizational standing requiring the existence of a 
member with individual standingiw was part of the irreducible constitutional 
minimum for representational standing, Congress could not abrogate or 
short circuit that element.18' 
Nevertheless, like the Stincer court, the Ninth Circuit determined that 
the Oregon Advocacy Center's mentally disabled constituents had sufficient 
indicia of membership to satisfy the Hunt test.lS6 The court focused on the 
statutorily required participation of mentally disabled persons on both the 
governing board and the advisory board of the Advocacy center.18' 
Significantly, the court acknowledged that the Advocacy Center's 
constituents possessed less than all of the indicia of membership required by 
Hunt: 
Admittedly, the constituents of OAC do not have all the indicia of 
membership that the Hunt apple growers and dealers possessed. 
OAC is funded primarily by the federal government, and not by its 
constituents. OAC's constituents are not the only ones who choose 
the leadership of OAC, and they are not the only ones who may 
serve on OAC's leadership bodies. Nevertheless, OAC's 
constituents do possess many indicia of membership--enough to 
Or. Advocacy Ctr., 322 F.3d at 1 1  10. 
lE3Id. at 1113. 
' ~ 4  Hunt, 432 U.S. at 333 ("[aln association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its 
members when: (a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own 
ri t . . . ."). 
'Or. Advocacy Ctr., 322 F.3d at 1 1  10 (citing United Food & Commercial Workers Union 
Local 75 1 v. Brown Group, Inc., 5 17 U.S. 544,551 (1996)). 
Id. at 1 1  12-13. 
"' Id. at 1 1  1 1  (quoting 42 U.S.C. 8 lOSOS(c)(l)(B)). 
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satisfy the purposes that undergird the concept of associational 
standing: that the organization is sufficiently identified with and 
subject to the influence of those it seeks to represent as to have a 
"personal stake in the outcome of the controversy. ,9188 
Oregon Advocacy Center represents a significant departure in the law of 
standing from cases such as American Legal ~ounda t ion , '~~  Health 
Research ~ r o u ~ , ' ~ '  and Basel Action ~etwork . '~ '  Significantly, the Oregon 
Advocacy court explicitly held that the factors found sufficient in Hunt were 
not the irreducible minimum to establish indicia of membership.'92 While 
the court discussed the presence on both the advisory and governing boards 
of members of the constituent class,193 the court deemed it unnecessary to 
consider whether the constituent group as a whole had any right to 
participate in the selection of governing or advisory board members.'" Also 
implicit in the decision is the court's acceptance of a class of constituent 
members consisting of all mentally disabled people in the State of 
~ r e~on '~ ' - a  class of putative membership nearly as broad as the class of 
"all television viewers" emphatically rejected by the American Legal 
~ o u n d a t i o n ' ~ ~  court-without reference to whether they took any action to 
become "constituents." Nor did the court inquire whether any constituents in 
the subclass at issue in the case-mentally disabled criminal defendants- 
were present on the advisory board or governing board. 
It is tempting to distinguish Oregon Advocacy Center as a special case, 
involving a constituency (mentally disabled people) that by definition may 
not be able to exercise fill membership rights of voting and control. 
However, Oregon Advocacy Center and Stincer also involve specific 
congressional legislation,'97 potentially distinguishing these cases from the 
environmental standing cases which lack specific laws on point. But as 
Oregon Advocacy Center acknowledged, Congress cannot reduce the 
minimum Article I11 requirements for organizational standing,198 which, 
la8 Id. at 1 1  1 1  (quoting Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 
261 (1977)). 
l S 9  808 F.2d 84; see also supra Part 1I.A. 
82 F.R.D. 21; see also supra Part 1I.A. 
19' 370 F. Supp. 2d 57; see also supra Part II.B.2.d. 
19* Or. Advocacy Ctr., 322 F.3d at 1 1  13. 
l g 3  Id. at 1 1 12. 
Ig4Id. at 1113. 
l g 5  Id. at 1 1  12-13. 
'% Am. Legal Found.. 808 F.2d at 90-91. 
I g 7  In the form of the PAMII Act, Pub. L. No. 99-319, 100 Stat. 478. 
l g 8  Or. Advocacy Ctr., 322 F.3d at I 108. 
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according to the Supreme Court, include some concept of equivalence to a 
membership 0rgani~ation.l~~ Oregon Advocacy Center thus establishes 
standing for advocacy groups organized without a formal voting 
membership, based on more indirect means of influencing organizational 
This holding may well serve as a model for standing of similarly 
organized environmental advocacy groups. 
111. How CONSTITUENTS INFLUENCE ORGANIZATIONS: A FUNCTIONAL 
ANALYSIS OF HUNZ"s "INDICIA OF MEMBERSHIP" 
As noted above, federal courts have not yet developed a consistent 
approach to applying Hunt's "indicia of membership" test2" to 
organizations lacking a voting, formally recognized, legal membership. 
Development of the constitutionally requisite "concrete adverseness" for 
Article I11 standing202 requires some measure of organizational 
responsiveness to the constituents the organizations would represent in 
court. Nevertheless, the minimum adequate means of accomplishing this 
responsiveness remains unclear. While some courts, such as the ALCOA,"~ 
Basel Action ~ e t w o r k , ~ ' ~  Health Research ~ r o u ~ , ~ ' ~  and Friends of the 
~ a r t h ~ ' ~  courts, have assumed or held that voting rights on the part of an 
organization's constituents are essential to this r e ~ ~ o n s i v e n e s s ~ ~ ~  other 
cases, such as Bayou  tee?" and Oregon Advocacy ~ e n t e ? ~  have found 
representational standing in the absence of constituent election of the 
organization's governing body.210 Courts also take differing views on the 
extent of active affiliation of the organization's constituents: Hunt itself 
accepted standing for an organization whose constituents were compelled to 
participate21' and Oregon Advocacy Center likewise accepted 
representational standing for constituents who apparently took no voluntary 
action whatsoever to affiliate themselves with the organization.212 On the 
Id. at 11 1 1 (addressing the decision in Vill. ofArlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 261). 
'O0 Id. 
See supra note 41. 
'02 Baker, 369 U.S. at 204 (addressing the criteria of U.S. CONST. art. 111, 5 2). 
'03 ALCOA, 585 F. Supp. 842; see also supra Part II.B.2. 
'04 370 F. Supp. 2d 57; see also supra Part II.B.2.d. 
'05 82 F.R.D. 21; see also supra Part ILA. 
129 F.3d 826; see also supra Part II.B.2.b. 
'07 See generally supra Parts II.A., II.B.2.b., & II.B.2.d. 
'" Bayou Steel, Inc., Civ. No. 96-0432; see also Part II.B.2.c. 
'09 322 F.3d I 101; see also Part 1I.C. 
*I0 See generally supra Part II.B.2.c.; Or. Advocacy Ctr., 322 F.3d at 11 11-1 112. 
2" See Hunt, 432 U.S. at 334. 
'" Or. Advocacy Ctr., 322 F.3d at 11 13. 
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other hand, American Legal ~ o u n d a t i o n ~ ' ~  emphatically rejected the notion 
that a non-membership organization could represent the interests of a class 
of constituents who had taken no steps to affiliate themselves with the 
plaintiff 
According to the Supreme Court, the standing doctrine under Article I11 
of the Constitution is meant to ensure the "concrete adversariness" 
necessary for adequate presentation of justiciable issues to the The 
organizational standing doctrine, ensures this concrete adversariness by 
making sure that there exists some real person with real interests underlying 
the litigation, and that the organization litigating on his or her behalf 
responds to those  interest^.^'^ In essence, the court must be able to attribute 
the litigation decisions-when to litigate, what to litigate, how to litigate- 
to the class of interested (and injured) persons themselves, and not to an 
organizational "interested bystander. 3,217 
Examination of these standing interests reveals that, although voting 
rights are one means of promoting organizational responsiveness to the 
interested constituents, they are neither the only such means nor the most 
effective. Voluntary association with an organization combined with 
substantial financing for the organization's activities, is, as a practical 
matter, at least as effective a means of enforcing board responsiveness as 
voting rights, particularly within larger organizations. 
213 808 F.2d 84; see also supra Part 1I.A. 
'I4 Am. Legal Found., 808 F.2d at 90. 
'I5 Baker, 369 U.S. at 204. 
'I6 Hunt, 432 U.S. at 342-343, quoting Warth, 422 U.S. at 51 1 ("Even in the absence of 
injury to itself, an association may have standing solely as the representative of its 
members. . . . The wsociation must allege that its members, or any one of them, are suffering 
immediate or threatened injury as a result of the challenged action of the sort that would 
make out a justiciable case had the members themselves brought suit. . . . So long as this can 
be established, and so long as the nature of the claim and of the relief sought does not make 
the individual participation of each injured party indispensable to proper resolution of the 
cause, the association may be an appropriate representative of its members, entitled to invoke 
the court's jurisdiction."). 
'" United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669,687 
(D. Col. 1973) (The Court reiterated that in Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 735, it stressed "the 
importance of demonstrating that the party seeking review be himself among the injured, for 
it is this requirement that gives a litigant a direct stake in the controversy and prevents the 
judicial process from becoming no more than a vehicle for the vindication of the value 
interests of concerned bystanders."). 
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A. Voting Rights 
To be sure, membership voting rights promote board responsiveness to 
membership interests. A credible threat of not being re-elected at the next 
annual membership meeting certainly sharpens the minds of board 
members, improves communications, and generally promotes 
responsiveness to membership concerns. As a matter of principle, one can 
fairly attribute an elected board's litigation decisions to the membership that 
elected that board. This is even more true for smaller membership groups 
with geographically cohesive interests, such as the group of apple producers 
involved in ~ u n t . ' ' ~  
As organizational size increases and membership diversity likewise 
increases in terms of geography and interests, voting rights may become less 
effective as a means of ensuring organizational responsiveness. The 
Northern District of New York was seemingly correct in ALCOA, affirming 
that the Sierra Club could assert organizational standing on behalf of its 
upstate New York Nevertheless, it is difficult to say that that 
handful of members exerted any real influence in the Sierra Club's decision 
to seek out and litigate against ALCOA. In fact, ALCOA itself argued that 
the Sierra Club uncovered its violations and commenced the lawsuit without 
first consulting any of the members it relied on for standing purposes.220 
B. Board Eligibility 
The Supreme Court in Hunt specifically included the exclusive 
eligibility to serve on the association's board as one of the "indicia of 
membership" necessary for standing.22' As noted, the Oregon Advocacy 
Center court found this factor to be non-essential and recognized 
organizational standing on the part of an organization whose board was not 
exclusively limited to the constituency served by the ~r~anization."~ 
Certainly, a board consisting exclusively of members of the constituency 
whose litigation interests the organization represents would be more likely 
to respond to those constituents' concerns, ensuring the necessary "concrete 
ad~erseness"~'~ in the litigation. One might find it more difficult to define 
218 Hunt, 432 U.S. 333. 
' I 9  ALCOA, 585 F. Supp. at 852. 
220 Id. 
Hunt, 432 U.S. at 334. 
Or. Advocacy Ctr., 322 F.3d at 1 101; see supra Part 1I.C. 
223 Or. Advocacy Ctr., 322 F.3d at 1109 (referring to Baker, 369 U.S. at 204, which explained 
standing: "[hlave the appellants alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the 
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of  issues 
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this factor in the case of an environmental advocacy organization. In Hunt, 
the class of apple producers and marketers involved in the litigation was 
relatively well-defined (and indeed, already legally defined by the state as it 
collected assessments).224 With environmental organizations, defining the 
class of those interested in a particular environmental resource becomes 
somewhat nebulous, as one can expect that the universe of persons with a 
sufficient interest in the resource to support standing would be much larger 
than the group sufficiently committed to the resource to participate in an 
advocacy organization. At some level, the environment affects every human 
being. Unless there are defined membership criteria, however, the statement 
that the environment must affect a person in order for him to serve on the 
board is fairly meaningless, and cannot be expected to ensure sufficient 
responsiveness and "adverseness" on the part of the board. Moreover, 
simple membership in the group of affected persons does not necessarily 
ensure that an individual responds to and represents the sentiments of a 
consensus of the group. 
C. Voluntary Aflliation 
Voluntary association as an indicia of membership was lacking in the 
Hunt case.225 While the Hunt Court found this factor n~n-essent ia l ,~~~ there 
remains the question whether voluntariness of association with the litigating 
organization can substitute for one of the other factors that was present in 
Hunt, such as voting rights. 
Voluntariness of association should provide at least as much influence 
on organizational management as board participation in the constituent 
group. Indeed, the affirmative action of an organization's constituents to 
affiliate with the organization in order to support its advocacy efforts, and to 
disaffiliate with the organization when they are dissatisfied with those 
efforts, may provide nearly as much practical influence on management as 
the bare right to vote for directors, especially where that right to vote is 
highly diluted by a large membership. As noted, the Fifth Circuit found the 
voluntariness of the constituents' affiliation with Friends of the Earth to be 
one of the crucial factors supporting organizational standing.227 Most public 
interest organizations rely on the numbers of their membership both for 
upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions? 
This is the gist o f  the question of standing." (emphasis added)). 
Hunt, 432 U.S. at 333. 
*" See Hunt, 432 U.S at 344-45 for indicia that were included. See also supra note 41. 
'" Hunt, 432 U.S. at 345. 
'" Friends of the Earth, 129 F.3d at 869. 
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fundraising and to assert their influence before government agencies; 
therefore, loss of membership numbers can cripple an organization's 
effectiveness. The ability of an organization's constituents to join or quit the 
group would appear to be a very effective means of ensuring the 
responsiveness of the organization's management-and also ensuring the 
"concrete adverseness" required for organizational standing.228 As noted by 
Professor Paul Wapner in a symposium on international nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs), 
Members are the life-blood of many NGOs. They provide 
institutional strength, insofar as they can be called upon to write 
letters, protest, or otherwise mobilize on behalf of the organization. 
Merely by virtue of their numbers, members can serve to 
demonstrate the legitimacy of the organization's agenda. 
Developing a membership does not come as a matter of course; 
neither does sustaining it. NGOs must engage their members. They 
must act in ways that satis9 and even excite members and garner 
additional support. When an NGO fails to do so, it loses members 
and, thus, loses support and institutional strength. It is important to 
realize that loss (or gain) of membership does not happen every two, 
four, or any other particular number of years (as it does in many 
states) but can happen immediately. When supporters no longer feel 
satisfied by the NGO, they are no longer available to be mobilized 
or otherwise advocate on behalf of the group. Members vote with 
their feet.229 
The influence of voluntary participation on organizational management 
takes on added importance when combined with the constituents' ability to 
give, or withhold, funding for the organization. 
228 See Baker, 369 U.S. at 204. 
U9 Paul Wapner, The Democratic Accountability of Nongovernmental Organizations: 
Defending Accountability in NGOs, 3 CHI. J .  INT'L L. 197,201 (2002). 
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D. Financial Support 
The Hunt Court found it telling that the apple businesses involved in the 
litigation financed the Apple Advertising Commission through mandatory 
assessments.230 It is unclear how such mandatory assessments would ensure 
Commission responsiveness to its constituents' concerns any more than 
financing from general state revenues. At the extreme, bankrupting the 
Washington apple industry would remove the Commission's financing as 
well as its reason for existence. However, it is still difficult to see how 
reliance on mandatory assessments from a particular industry promotes 
responsiveness to that industry. 
Voluntary financing of an organization's activities, on the other hand, 
might be the most effective means of ensuring responsiveness. Many grass 
roots environmental organizations almost wholly depend on small 
contributions from individual  constituent^,^^' regardless of whether the 
donor can vote. If those constituents are dissatisfied with the direction the 
organization is taking, or with its advocacy efforts, they may then "vote with 
their pocketbooks" and cease financial support for the organization. As 
noted by Wapner, 
Members also vote with their pocketbooks. Few NGOs are self- 
funded to the degree that they are free from the burden of 
developing a dues-paying membership base or reaching outside the 
organization for funds. Raising money for operations is often a full- 
time endeavor. When members exit because they disagree or fail to 
be excited by an NGO's activities, they take their money with them, 
reducing not only the amount of regular dues, but also the periodic 
donations that many groups depend upon to mobilize for specific 
projects. In this latter regard, NGOs are perpetually accountable to 
the membership insofar as periodic donations for particular 
campaigns provide both an affirmation of an NGO's activities and 
the financial ability actually to carry out specific projects.232 
To be sure, the influence member contributions have on a group's 
direction will vary greatly from organization to organization. True grass 
230 Hunt, 432 U.S. at 333 (mandatory assessments are annual dues paid by membemhip in 
order to finance the organization's activities). 
231 See, e.g., Sierra Club, supra note 55, at https://ww2.sierraclub.org/membership/. 
232 Wapner, supra note 229, at 201. Professor Wapner finishes his essay with the conclusion 
that these non-constitutional controls on NGO conduct (voluntary membership and voluntary 
financing) provide a level of accountability to constituents that is comparable to, if not 
exceeding that, of a liberal democratic state. Id. 
Heinonline - -  14 Se. Envtl. L.J. 8 0  2 0 0 5 - 2 0 0 6  
Fall 20051 Is VOTING NECESSARY? 8 1 
roots organizations that depend primarily on small donations from many 
constituents can be expected to be more responsive to membership 
concerns; organizations hnded chiefly through large grants or donations 
from a few individuals may be less responsive to constituent concerns. 
E. Summary: Organizational Responsiveness and Voting Rights 
Although there is little literature on the accountability of non-profit 
organizations to their members, such literature as there is suggests that 
voluntary membership and voluntary financial support are at least as 
important to securing organizational accountability to an organization's 
constituents as membership voting rights in governing board elections.233 
Hunt found that voting rights and involuntary financial support were 
sufficient indicia of membership to support the "concrete adverseness" 
necessary to establish standing.234 However, the Court did not explicitly 
state whether other factors might also provide sufficient indicia of 
membership in the absence of voting rights.235 From this, then, alternative 
means of ensuring responsiveness and "concrete adverseness," such as 
reliance on voluntary financial support from an organization's constituents 
who individually have standing could suffice to establish organizational 
standing even in the absence of formal voting rights. The sufficiency of 
voluntary constituent financial support may depend on the particular 
circumstances of the organization in question. It seems likely that an 
o~ganization primarily relying on contributions from a grass roots 
constituency, which would individually have standing could be found to 
have sufficient "indicia" of being a membership organization even without 
formal membership voting rights per the organizational standing 
requirements found in ~ u n t . ~ ' ~  
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS TO ACCOMMODATE VOTING RIGHTS AND THE 
NEED FOR INDEPENDENCE FROM HOSTILE TAKEOVER 
Although the preceding analysis shows that advocacy organizations 
could potentially rely on voluntary financial support from its constituency to 
establish organizational standing for that constituency, the cases discussed 
in the second section of this Article demonstrate that the applicable law is 
far from certain.237 Reliance solely on a non-voting, financially supportive 
"3 See, e.g., id. 
'" Hunt, 432 U.S. at 344-45 (citing BaRer, 369 U.S. at 204). 
235 Id. 
236 Id. 
237 See, e.g., supra Part 11. 
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constituency to establish standing brings the risk of an adverse decision 
should a court rely on more restrictive precedents.238 
While granting members voting rights makes organizational standing 
more likely, conversion of advocacy organizations to formal membership 
corporations with fill membership voting rights has disadvantages. 
Conversion cames with it the administrative burdens of maintaining 
membership records; conducting annual membership meetings; and 
distributing, collecting, and counting ballots. It also poses ,the organizational 
risk of hostile takeover by adverse interests as discussed above.239 Little can 
be done to reduce the administrative burdens of maintaining a formal 
membership structure. However, there are defensive measures that an 
advocacy organization may take to prevent a hostile takeover, or at least to 
make such a conflict more difficult. This section of the Article explores 
some of the alternative measures an organization may take to improve a 
claim for standing, while minimizing its exposure to hostile takeover. 
A. Applicable Corporation Law Principles 
The effectiveness and potential implementation of any of these 
defensive measures will depend, to some extent, on the applicable not-for- 
profit corporation law of the state of incorporation of an advocacy 
organization. Some states have adopted versions of the Revised Model 
Nonprofit Corporation Act (RMCNPCA);~~' other states have developed 
their own, homegrown nonprofit corporation statutes. Typically, these 
statutes control the terms of directors, provide for establishment of different 
classes of membership, provide for removal of directors, or require full 
voting rights for certain classes of members. While a survey of all the 
nonprofit corporation laws of the fifty states is well beyond the scope of this 
article, this section will discuss pertinent provisions of the RMNPCA, as 
well as salient provisions of the nonprofit corporation laws of New ~ o r k ? ~ '  
the District of ~olumbia :~~ and ~alifornia~~~-jurisdictions where many 
advocacy organizations are incorporated. 
See Health Research Group, 82 F.R.D. 21, 26-28 (holding that to gain organizational 
standing, an organi~ation must have indicia of membership or some other substantial nexus). 
239 See supra Part I.C. 
REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT COW. ACT (1987). 
24' See N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW (2000). 
"' D.C. CODE $5 29-301.01-29.301.58 (2001). 
243 CAL. COW. CODE $8 5000-14551 (2004). 
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B. Non- Voting Membership Defensive Measures to Assure Responsiveness 
1. Advisory Boards 
The Oregon Advocacy ~ e n t e ? ~ ~  and ~tince?~' line of cases have 
endorsed the implementation of advisory boards that include the represented 
constituency as a factor supporting de facto membership.'& An 
environmental advocacy organization might simply constitute an advisory 
board and include constituents likely to have standing on that board.247 This 
measure does not actually entail altering the structure of the organization to 
include a formal voting membership, and thus the organization can avoid the 
administrative burdens associated with a voting membership. There exists 
some administrative burden, however, with arranging for selection of 
advisory board members and their attendance at meetings. Advisory boards 
generally do not have any final authority in the management of an 
organization.248 However, board members may attend meetings and make 
recommendations. 
It remains to be seen whether courts will accept advisory boards that 
include standing constituents to satis@ the Hunt "indicia of membership" 
test.249 An environmental advocacy organization might find it difficult to 
ensure that its advisory board will have the appropriate standing witnesses 
as members for a given litigation. Nevertheless, constituting an advisory 
board may prove an effective means of improving an advocacy 
organization's responsiveness and representational capacity without either 
14' 322 F.3d 1101. 
14' 175 F.3d 879. , 
246 See Or. Advocacy Ctr., 322 F.3d at 11 11-12; Stincer. 175 F.3d at 886. 
247 See Hunt, 432 U.S. at 342 ("an association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its 
members when: (a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own 
right. . . ."). See also John S .  Applegate, Beyond the Usual Suspects: The Use of Citizen 
Advisory Boar& in Environmental Decision Making, 73 IND. LJ. 903 (1998) (discussing the 
role of citizen advisory boards within the environmental decisipn making process which 
explores the role of these boards in allowing greater discussion of issues and increased 
participation by members). 
REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT COW. ACT 5 8.25 authorizes a board of directors to delegate 
limited board authority to committees consisting of "members of the board." The New York 
Not-for-Profit Law, California Corporation Code, and D.C. Code similarly provide that any 
committee with delegated authority from the board of directors shall consist of board 
members. N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT LAW 5 712; CAL COW. CODE 5 5212; D.C. CODE 5 29- 
301.22. 
249 432 U.S. at 345; see Or. Advocacy Ctr., 322 F.3d at 11 13 (holding "'that in light of the role 
Congress assigned by statute to advocacy organizations such as OAC, Congress abrogated 
the third prong of the Hunt test." Therefore the court did not address the need of participation 
by persons with individual standing in the suit). 
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the risk of hostile takeover or the administrative burdens associated with a 
voting membership. 
2. Constituents on Board for Standing Puruoses 
Another solution to ensure representational standing without opening 
h l l  control of the board to a voting membership is to select board members 
with an eye to ensuring that at least some of the directors would have 
individual standing in the areas that the environmental advocacy 
organization litigates. Since such directors participate hlly in the 
management of the organization, it would be hard for a court to deny that at 
least the directors of a self-perpetuating board can supply the necessary 
individual standing to support representational standing by the organization. 
It may be difficult, however, to ensure that individual board members will 
have standing in all the geographic and environmental areas of interest to 
the organization, particularly in the case of a larger national or regional 
organization. 
C. Structuring a Voting Membership 
If an organization decides to go the route of incorporating a voting 
membership, several means may be available to minimize or eliminate the 
risk of a hostile takeover of the organization by an organized group 
antithetical to the organization's purposes. The RMNPCA, as well as other 
state statutes, all allow classification of membership, with different classes 
of membership having different voting rights.2S0 It may thus be possible to 
ensure that the at-large membership does not control the board of directors. 
Similarly, it may be possible to structure the Board of Directors so that only 
a minority of directors is elected by the membership at large. Even if all 
directors are elected by the at-large membership, staggered director's terms 
combined with relatively long terms of office would make it difficult for an 
opposition group to gain control.251 Finally, the organization may impose 
waiting requirements or other formal membership requirements to ensure 
that no group is successhl in co-opting control of the organization.252 
250 REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. Am $ 6.10. See also N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT LAW 
$ 601(a); CAL. CORP. CODE $ 5330; D.C. CODE $ 29-301.12. 
'" See Dennis J. Block, Jonathan M. Hoff, & H. Ester Cochran, Defensive Measures in 
Anticipation of and in Response to Hostile Takeover Attempts, 972 PLYCORP. 93, 109-1 10 
(1997). 
252 See generally id. 
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1. Classification of Members 
The RMNPCA, as well as the state statutes examined, provide that a 
membership organization may set up different classifications of members 
with different voting rights.253 Thus, some classes of members may have 
limited voting rights, or even no voting rights, as long as some combination 
of membership classes possesses all the voting rights. 
With classified membership, an organization might split its membership 
into "associate members," who become members automatically upon joining 
the organization, and "sustaining members" (or some other similar category) 
who are elected to such membership by the board. Full membership voting 
rights, with the right to elect a majority of the board, might be reserved to 
board members, or might be reserved for persons who have been associate 
members for a specified number of years first.254 The class of "associate 
members" could have the right to elect some portion of the board of 
directors, but far less than a majority, ensuring that no upheaval among the 
associate membership could wrest control of the organization from its core 
founders. Standing witnesses could be drawn from the ranks of these 
associate members with some confidence that the Hunt representative 
standing test would be satisfied.2s5 These associate members would elect 
directors, and while they could not thus control the organization, their voice 
would be heard on the board. As the ALCOA court suggested that voting 
control was not necessary to satisfy ~ u n t : ~ ~  individual members who cannot 
elect a majority of board directors should not defeat organizational standing. 
2. At-Large Election of Less Than a Maiority: Ex Officio Directors 
One solution to the hostile takeover problem would be to allow the 
membership to elect some board members, but less than a majority of the 
board, with the remaining majority of directors elected by the board. This 
hybrid, self-perpetuating organizational structure might seem to be 
precluded by statutory requirements that necessitate some combination of 
253 REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT $6.10; N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT LAW 5 601(a); CAL. 
CORP. CODE 8 5330; D.C. CODE 8 29-301.12. 
lS4 Id. See, e.g., Greenpeace, supra note 57. 
lS5 Hunt, 432 U.S. at 343; see supra text accompanying note 41 for discussion of the Hunt 
r~resentative standing test. 
2S ALCOA, 585 F. Supp. at 851-52 (the court found that the Sierra Club met the requisite 
elements of associational standing according to the Supreme Court's opinions and refused to 
consider the additional restriction of voting control). 
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membership class have full voting rights.'" If some directors are elected by 
the board rather than a combination of membership classes, no combination 
of membership classes would be deemed to have full voting rights. 
However, there may yet be ways to structure a not-for-profit board to 
allow the board to select a majority of its members. The nonprofit 
corporation statutes contemplate that some directorships may be accorded to 
people by virtue of their office with the corporation or otherwise be 
"designated" or "appointed."258 These ex-officio board seats are typically 
not subject to election (other than the means by which the by-laws 
e~tablish)."~ While the most obvious situation would be to have a board seat 
set aside for the corporation's president, vice-president, or executive 
director, there does not seem to be any limit on the number or type of such 
offices ~reated.'~' A not-for-profit could designate a majority of board slots 
for persons designated to a specific organizational function-perhaps the 
office of "watershed steward" for particular watersheds or some similar 
designation. The by-laws could provide that these offices would be filled by 
vote of the board of directors for a specified term, while the remaining 
directors' seats (a minority) could be elected by the at-large membership, 
without risk of hostile takeover. 
3. Staggered Directors' Terms 
By staggering the terms of directors and providing for lengthy directors' 
terms in ofice, a hostile takeover of a board of directors becomes difficult, 
as it may require passage of several election cycles before an opposition 
group could obtain a majority of seats on the board. The RMNPCA and 
other statutes specifically allow directors' terms to be and 
'" See N.Y. NOT:FOR-PROFIT COW. LAW 5 612. But see generally REVISED MODEL 
NONPROFIT CORP. ACT; D.C. CODE $5 29-301.01-29.301.58; CAL. COW. CODE 
5 5 5000- 1455 1 (containing no similar requirement). 
N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT COW. LAW 8 703(a) provides that persons may be become directors 
by appointment or by virtue of their holding a particular ofice within the corporation. See 
also REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT COW. ACT 5 8.04(a); CAL. COW. CODE 5 5220(d); and D.C. 
CODE 5 2 1-30 1.19(b) (each providing for directors who are "designated" or "appointed" 
rather than being elected). 
259 Id. 
See REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT COW. LAW 4 8; CAL. COW. CODE 5 5220; D.C. CODE 
29-301,19; N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT COW. LAW $5 702-703. 
' REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT COW. ACT 5 8.06; CAL. CORP. CODE 5 5220(~); D.C. CODE 
6 29-301.19(c); N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT COW. LAW 704(a). 
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impose a maximum term for directors of five years.262 It would take three 
annual election cycles to gain control of the board in such a situation. 
There are two potential risks with this approach, however. First, the 
RMNPCA provides that any director may be removed at any annual meeting 
by a majority of members entitled to elect that director, with or without 
cause.263 Other statutes require cause for such a In a state where 
the RMNPCA applies, staggered terms would provide no defense against an 
orchestrated attempt to gain control of the organization by an outside group. 
Second, with lengthy terms come likely director defections and resignations 
before terms end. While many corporate by-laws contemplate that the board 
may fill an unexpired term of a resigning director by simple majority vote, 
the New York Not-for-Profit Corporation Law specifically provides that 
such a replacement is limited to a term ending at the next annual 
membership meeting, at which time the seat is open to a membership 
vote.265 This requirement poses the risk that a majority of board seats could 
come up for vote at any time. 
4. Membershiv Qualifications 
Finally, an organization may achieve some measure of defense against 
an organized attempt to co-opt the organization by imposing membership 
qualification or approval requirements. At a minimum, a would-be member 
could be required to contribute to the organization regularly for a period of 
years before being granted full membership status. Alternatively, 
membership could be subject to a formal approval process, either by the 
board of directors, or by a committee, which would ensure that each 
applicant for membership shares the organization's values and goals. 
While potentially effective, these alternatives may impose huge 
administrative costs. Reviewing each proposed membership for consistency 
with the organization's mission requires a large investment of time, either 
by board members or organizational staff. While a waiting period may be 
REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT COW. ACT 4 8.05; N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT COW. LAW 
8 703(b). See also D.C. CODE 5 29-301.19 (providing no limit on board of directors terms); 
CAL. COW. CODE 8 5220(a) (limiting directors terms to three years). 
263 REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT COW. ACT 5 8.08. See also CAL. COW. CODE 5 5222; D.C. 
CODE 4 29-301.19 (unless the by-laws provide for removal only for cause). 
'" N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT COW. LAW 8 706 (unless by-laws provide for removal without 
cause). 
''' N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT COW. LAW 5 705(c). See also generally REVISED MODEL 
NONPROFIT COW. ACT; CAL. COW. CODE $4 5000-14551; D.C. CODE $8 29-301.01- 
29.301.58 (providing no such limit). 
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self-administering, such a requirement would preclude recruiting members 
specifically to ensure standing for a particular litigation. Ultimately, these 
sorts of membership controls are probably impractical in a large 
organization. 
Because many public interest organizations, like environmental 
advocacy groups, are organized in such a way that the organization's 
constituency does not vote to select the board of directors or officers of the 
organization:66 the question of whether membership voting rights are an 
essential element of representational standing is of great importance. 
Despite the Supreme Court's declaration in Sierra Club v.  ort ton^^^ that 
public interest environmental organizations must rely on the interests of 
identifiable members of the voting rights should not be 
essential to ascertain such representational standing. 
As indicated above, courts have applied the Supreme Court's "indicia of 
membership" test269 for organizational standing inconsistently to advocacy 
organizations that do not afford voting rights to their members. A functional 
analysis of the Hunt factors270 indicates that a constituency that provides 
substantial voluntary financial support to an organization is at least as 
effective in ensuring organizational responsiveness and the "concrete 
ad~ersity"~" necessary to support standing. Given the uncertainty in the law, 
however, there are several measures organizations may take to constitute a 
voting membership without risking hostile takeover or other similar adverse 
action. Perhaps one of several alternate forms of association listed in this 
Article will improve an organization's chances of establishing standing in 
order to litigate issues that concern its constituency. 
266 See Steen & Hopkins, supra note 8, at 21 1.  
267 405 U.S. 727. 
268 Id. at 739-40. 
269 See Hunt, 432 U.S. at 344-45. 
270 Id. 
27' See Baker, 369 U.S. at 204. 
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